Note: translated from Polish
By decision of 2 December 2025 (ref. no. I CSK 3236/24), the Supreme Court once again took a position on the prerequisites for the court to establish the separation of matrimonial property, with particular emphasis on the importance of the de facto separation of the spouses and the admissibility of granting separation to a date earlier than the date on which the action was brought.
The Supreme Court unequivocally pointed out that Article 52 § 2 of the Civil Procedure Code, which provides for the possibility of establishing the separation of property on a date earlier than the date on which the action was brought in the event of de facto separation, does not create an obligation on the part of the court to issue such a decision in every case of the separated spouses. This provision only grants the court the power to rule on separation with a retroactive date, if the circumstances of a particular case so require. The key importance is not so much the separation itself, understood as the lack of cohabitation or residence, but its actual impact on the sphere of legal and property relations between the spouses.
In the justification of the decision, the Supreme Court emphasized that when assessing „important reasons” within the meaning of Article 52 § 1 of the Civil Procedure Code, it is necessary to focus on whether the de facto separation resulted in such a breakdown of property relations that prevented the spouses from cooperating in the management of joint property. Only in a situation where it was actually impossible to jointly administer the property on a date earlier than the filing of the action, can we speak of the legitimacy of establishing the separation of property with a retroactive date. The mere fact of the existence of de facto separation does not prejudge either the existence of „compelling reasons” or the date on which the separation occurred.
The Supreme Court also pointed out that the „important reasons” clause is flexible
and leaves the court a wide range of decision-making freedom, requiring an individual assessment of the facts each time. Therefore, not every form of de facto separation, even a long-term one, will be considered a sufficient basis for the court’s interference in the property regime of the spouses. It is necessary to demonstrate specific, significant financial consequences, such as disorganization of the management of the joint property, the inability to make joint decisions or a real threat to the interests of one of the spouses.
In conclusion, the establishment of separation of property with a date earlier than the date of filing the lawsuit is exceptional and cannot be treated as an automatic consequence of de facto separation. What is more, this ruling emphasizes the importance of proper preparation of the action for the establishment of separation of property and the need to demonstrate in detail that the de facto separation had a real and lasting impact on the possibility of joint management of property, and was not limited only to the sphere of the personal relationship between the spouses.