In the judgment I CKN 788/97 of 1998, the Supreme Court stated that remaining in cohabitation by a divorced spouse entitled to alimony is not a statutory premise for the expiry of the alimony obligation of the other divorced spouse towards him.
The judgment in question was issued in a case in which the plaintiff demanded maintenance from her ex-husband. The court of first and second instance focused on considering whether the claimant was in need pursuant to Art. 60 § 1 of the Family and Guardianship Code, and it was the existence of this premise that made the award of alimony – ultimately, the alimony payment was awarded by the appellate court. However, in the cassation appeal, the defendant raised a new objection, claiming that the plaintiff was in a cohabitation, and therefore his maintenance obligation towards her had expired. The defendant relied on the broad interpretation of Art. 60 § 3 of the Family and Guardianship Code (which states that the maintenance obligation expires when a divorced person enters into a new marriage), claiming that in practice there is no difference between marriage and cohabitation, so also leaving one of the former spouses in cohabitation should exempt the other from the maintenance obligation.
The Supreme Court rejected the defendant’s argument, emphasizing that Art. 60 § 3 k.r.o. expressly mentions the conclusion of a new marriage by the person entitled to a maintenance allowance as a condition for the expiry of this obligation towards him. This provision cannot be interpreted broadly, and the defendant’s allegation is not substantively justified. The Supreme Court also emphasized that a negative assessment of the applicable regulations cannot constitute the basis for a cassation appeal.